Abstract. All information-theoretically secure key agreement protocols (e.g. based on quantum cryptography or on noisy channels) described in the literature are secure only against passive adversaries in the sense that they assume the existence of an authenticated public channel. The goal of this paper is to investigate information-theoretic security even against active adversaries with complete control over the communication channel connecting the two parties who want to agree on a secret key. Several impossibility results are proved and some scenarios are characterized in which secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries is possible. In particular, when each of the parties, including the adversary, can observe a sequence of random variables that are correlated between the parties, the rate at which key agreement against active adversaries is possible is characterized completely: it is either 0 or equal to the rate achievable against passive adversaries, and the condition for distinguishing between the two cases is given.
Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in cryptography is the generation of a shared secret key by two parties, Alice and Bob, not sharing a secret key initially, in the presence of an adversary Eve who has access to the communication channel connecting Alice and Bob. Several scenarios, which di er in their assumptions about Eve's capabilities and possibly about the intractability of certain computational problems, have been considered in the literature.
Public-key cryptography introduced by Di e and Hellman 9] (see also 20]) solves this problem under the two assumptions that (1) Eve is unable to solve a certain computational problem (such as factoring integers or computing discrete logarithms in a certain nite group) in feasible time, and 1 To appear in Advances in Cryptology -EUROCRYPT '97, W. Fumy (Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, Konstanz, Germany, May 1997. This work is supported in part by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grant no. 20-42105.94.
(2) that Eve has only passive (read) access to the communication channel between Alice and Bob, i.e., that the communication between Alice and Bob is authenticated. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the described key distribution problem when neither of these assumptions is made: We consider adversaries with in nite computing power and complete control over the communication channel connecting Alice and Bob. Several impossibility results are proved and some scenarios in which secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries is possible are characterized. Secret-key agreement can be possible in this scenario only if Alice and Bob (but possibly also Eve) have correlated information. More formally, while Alice and Bob share no secret key initially, they know some random variables X and Y , respectively, jointly distributed with a random variable Z known to Eve. The joint probability distribution is denoted P XY Z .
One can have di erent opinions about whether it is reasonable to assume that a speci c computational problem is di cult. Furthermore, since quantum computation has been invented as a (at least for now) theoretical model of computation, it is not completely clear whether intractability assumptions in the Turing machine model of computation are still adequate. There also exist different opinions about whether certain methods of authentication, like speaker identi cation on a voice channel, are strong enough to support the second assumption above. It is not a goal of this paper to discuss these issues, but we believe that avoiding both assumptions is an interesting research topic.
There exists a substantial body of results on secret-key agreement by public discussion secure against adversaries with in nite computing power (see Section 2.3 for a brief summary), but they all depend in a crucial manner on the assumption that eavesdroppers are passive and hence the communication between Alice and Bob can be assumed to be authenticated. Of course, as is pointed out in these papers, the authenticity can be guaranteed, even when the channel is completely insecure, when Alice and Bob initially share a secret key that is used for authentication purposes (see Section 2.2). Hence these results can be interpreted as providing information-theoretically secure protocols for expanding a short initially shared secret key to an arbitrarily long secret key. This paper characterizes scenarios in which secret-key agreement against active adversaries is possible and shows that for an important class of scenarios of correlated random variables available to Alice, Bob and Eve, active adversaries are not more powerful than passive ones. For stating impossibility results in the strongest possible form, we also consider protocols in which certain messages can be sent in a secret or authenticated manner (by appropriate means not speci ed by the protocol).
De nition 2. If a message C i is secret (by the protocol speci cation), Eve learns nothing about it except that it exists 2 . However, she may replace such a message by a di erent message. If a message C i is authenticated (by the protocol speci cation), then the receiver will always (with probability 1) detect any modi cation to the message due to Eve, but Eve sees the message.
Considering a passive adversary is equivalent to assuming the entire communication to be authenticated. The above de nition can be made informationtheoretically precise.
If two parties share a secret key, they can use the one-time pad encryption to transmit a message in perfect secrecy over a completely insecure channel. They can also use part of the secret key for authenticating messages (see Section 2.2). 1 The initialization phase summarizes the parties' entire initial information, for instance the history of previous executions of protocols, the information resulting from quantum transmissions (like in quantum cryptography 2]), or information received from other sources like a satellite broadcasting random bits (see Section 4.3) or the signal of a deep-space radio source. When the initialization phase is missing, this means that Alice's and Bob's complete knowledge at the beginning of the protocol is assumed to be statistically independent.
However, in contrast to perfect secrecy, perfect authenticity cannot be achieved even if a secret key of arbitrary xed size is used because an adversary can always guess the key with non-zero probability of success. Authenticity and con dentiality are dual security properties, and the duality can be shown in various ways (e.g., see 16] ).
All the protocol steps proposed in this paper are polynomial-time computable, but there may generally be steps in subprotocols taken from the literature that are not known to be computable in polynomial time. However, for every protocol resulting in Alice and Bob sharing a secret key mentioned here, there also exist e cient protocols for generating a secret key (which may be somewhat shorter).
In general, the distribution P XY Z may be under Eve's partial control and may only partly be known to Alice and Bob. Two examples are the privacy ampli cation scenario 3] mentioned in Section 2.3, and quantum cryptography, where both Bob's and Eve's distributions depend on the type of measurement performed by Eve on the photons sent by Alice. In this paper we assume that P XY Z is known to all parties.
In the sequel we assume without loss of generality that S and S 0 are binary strings of length jSj = jS 0 j = k. Clearly, the goal of a protocol is that S and S 0 agree with very high probability and that Eve has very little information about
S. An adversary can of course block the communication between Alice and Bob completely by replacing all messages by empty messages, thus preventing any secret-key agreement. The goal of the design of a protocol can thus only be to generate a (hopefully large amount of) secret key when Eve is passive, but to detect any tampering with very high probability. However, even when Eve's strategy is active, it is allowed that she goes undetected if the secret key shared by Alice and Bob at the end of the protocol nevertheless is secret. In other words, Alice and Bob should not primarily be interested in catching an active cheater but in making sure that whenever they believe (or at least one of them believes) to have agreed on a secret key, then this is indeed the case with very high probability. Eve is caught by at least Alice or Bob (i.e. they do not both accept) or they successfully generate a secret key S (and S 0 ) satisfying the above conditions. Note that one cannot require both Alice and Bob to reject. Eve could delete the last message from Alice to Bob (or vice versa) that would make Bob accept after Alice has accepted. (Byzantine agreement is impossible between two players in the presence of an active adversary.)
Here H(S) denotes the entropy 3 of S and I(S; C t Z) = H(S) ? H(SjC t Z) denotes the information about S given by Eve's total observation (consisting of C t and Z). The condition H(S) k ? implies that S is virtually uniformly distributed and together with the condition I(S; C t Z) it implies H(SjC t Z) k ? 2 and hence that S is also virtually uniformly distributed from Eve's point of view, i.e., given Eve's total information. Such a uniformity constraint could alternatively be de ned in terms of any reasonable constraint on the deviation of a distribution from the uniform distribution, without changing the results of this paper.
Unconditionally secure message authentication
Adversaries with complete control over the communication channel have previously been considered in message authentication scenarios where, unlike in this paper, a secret key is shared initially by Alice and Bob about which Eve is assumed to have no information a priori.
Unconditionally secure message authentication based on a shared secret key was rst considered in 11] and later in a large number of papers (e.g. 22] , 23]). One of the most recent papers on this topic is by Gemmell and Naor 10] who proved the surprising result that interactive protocols for authenticating an nbit message are more e cient in terms of the length of the secret key required to restrict an adversary's cheating probability to at most p. In particular, they proposed a one-round protocol using only log n ? 2 log p bits of secret key and showed that this can be reduced to log (k) n ? 5 log p in a k-round protocol. We will make use of these results.
Review of the literature
In this section some of the results on secret-key agreement by perfectly authenticated public discussion are reviewed. Shannon's 21] famous result on perfect secrecy, stating that a cipher can achieve perfect secrecy only if the entropy of the secret key is at least as large as the entropy of the plaintext, can be considered as a special case (for 1-round protocols) of Theorem 1 below. Although Wyner's wire-tap channel scenario 25] and Csisz ar and K orner's generalization 8] thereof do not include a public channel between Alice and Bob, they should nevertheless be mentioned here. In those scenarios, Alice can send information over a so-called broadcast channel where Bob and Eve can receive di erent outputs of the channel. Secret information transmission (and hence secret-key agreement) was shown to be possible if and only if Eve's channel is noisier than Bob's channel 8], an assumption that is generally unrealistic.
In the scenario considered in quantum cryptography (see 2] and references therein), Alice can send polarized light pulses of very low intensity to Bob over some channel (e.g. an optical ber) controlled by Eve. The use of this quantum communication results in Alice, Bob, and Eve possessing correlated strings. By subsequent discussion over the authenticated public channel, Alice and Bob manage to generate a secret key about which Eve has arbitrarily little information.
Another special case of key agreement protocols secure against passive adversaries is privacy ampli cation introduced in 4] and generalized in 3]. Privacy ampli cation is a protocol step that would typically be used as the last step in a practical key agreement protocol, but it can itself be described in the framework of key agreement protocols. Here Alice and Bob are assumed to know a string W (i.e. X = Y = W) about which Eve has some partial information. The protocol of 3] is secure even when Eve speci es an arbitrary probability distribution P ZW unknown to Alice and Bob, subject to the only constraint that a bound on the second order R enyi entropy of W, given Eve particular value z of Z, is known to Alice and Bob. In the privacy ampli cation literature only passive adversaries have been considered. It is proved in 19] that privacy ampli cation secure against active adversaries is possible when the adversary's min-entropy about the string is more than half its length.
The case of no common initial information
In this section we characterize to what extent secret and/or authenticated communication between Alice and Bob can help them to agree on a secret key. These results demonstrate an interesting di erence between computational and information-theoretic cryptography. In both models a secret channel from Alice to Bob can be transformed into an authenticated channel from Bob to Alice. This is achieved by Alice sending a secret key to Bob and Bob using the key in a message authentication techniques (see Section 2.2) for authenticating a message to be sent to Alice.
In sharp contrast, only the computational model allows to transform an authenticated channel from Alice to Bob into a secret channel from Bob to Alice. This is achieved by Alice sending her public key for a public-key cryptosystem to Bob who uses it to encrypt the message to be sent secretly to Alice. The security of public-key cryptosystems is inherently bound to be computational rather than information-theoretic. (Actually, this follows from Theorem 1 below.) See also 16] for a discussion of the described and other security transformations. It is hence not surprising that in the information-theoretic model, when Alice and Bob have no common information initially, authenticated channels are of no use, in contrast to secret channels. Theorem 1. Consider key agreement protocols without initialization phase which allow some of the exchanged messages to be either secret or authenticated. To prove the second part, notice that from Bob's point of view, Alice has no advantage compared to Eve. When Eve performs the same protocol as Alice would, pretenting to be Alice, Bob accepts with the same probability as he would accept a protocol execution with Alice which according to the de nition is 1.
Note again that the rst statement of the theorem is in sharp contrast to the public-key cryptographic scenario where, under a suitable intractability assumption, secret-key agreement secure against computationally bounded adversaries is possible when a single authenticated message in each direction can be sent. A public-key cryptosystem can be interpreted 16] as a means for transforming an authenticated channel into a secret channel in the other direction. The following well-known result is an observation following from Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. A public-key cryptosystem can be computationally secure but not information-theoretically (i.e. unconditionally) secure. Proof. Note that when the same message from Alice to Bob is both secret and authenticated, then Alice can simply send a secret key as the message. When two messages can be sent from Alice to Bob, one secret and one authenticated, then Alice can send a random n-bit string R to Bob (n ?2 log 2 ) over the secret channel and the description of a function f in a universal class hash functions from f0; 1g n to f0; 1g n 7] over the authenticated channel, together with the rst n=2 bits of f(R). The other half of f(R) is kept by Alice and Bob as their secret key. If Eve's capability to interfere with the secret channel is limited to sending fraudulent messages (but she is assumed to be unable to modify a message sent from Alice to Bob), then no universal hash function is needed; it could instead be replaced by the identity function.
The proof for the case of a secret channel from Bob to Alice is based on the following protocol. Bob (secretly) sends Alice a random string U of su cient length ( (log )). Then they use the above protocol where the authenticated channel is obtained by Alice by using an authentication scheme 10] using R as the secret key. Theorem 1 is pessimistic: it demonstrates that information-theoretically secure secret-key agreement against active or passive adversaries is impossible to achieve when the channel between Alice and Bob is completely insecure. However, if Alice and Bob have correlated information initially (not necessarily a secret key, but possibly only two bitstrings that are somehow correlated), about which also Eve has partial knowledge, then secret-key agreement can be possible.
In the following we consider such scenarios. One of our general goals is to achieve secret-key agreement under mild conditions on such an initialization phase, for instance conditions that can be argued to occur (or can be made to occur) in a realistic communications scenario.
Protocols with initialization phase 4.1 Impossibility results
The following theorem on authenticated public discussion follows from Corol- Theorem 4 states that secret-key agreement is possible and only if Y gives a substantial amount of information about X, both when Z is given or when it is not. In other words, X and Y must be correlated, and this correlation must to some extent be independent of Z. The 
Independent repetition of a random experiment
In order to be able to derive interesting results on secret-key agreement against active or passive adversaries, we must consider speci c types of probability distributions of the random variables given to Alice, Bob, and Eve.
One natural assumption is that the random experiment generating the triple X; Y; Z] is repeated many times independently. Hence we assume that Alice, Bob and Eve receive strings X n = X 1 ; : : : ; X n ], Y n = Y 1 ; : : : ; Y n ], and Z n = Z 1 ; : : : ; Z n ], respectively, where P X n Y n Z n (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; y 1 ; : : : ; y n ; z 1 ; : : : ; z n ) = n Y i=1 P XY Z (x i ; y i ; z i ):
Note that we have changed the notation here and for the rest of the paper:
P XY Z now denotes the distribution of one of several random experiments while it previously denoted the distribution of the overall experiment. This particular scenario is motivated by the well-known models for discrete memoryless sources and channels of communication theory. Many concrete practical scenarios can be modeled in this way, for instance the one discussed below in which Alice, Bob, and Eve receive noisy versions of a random string broadcast by a satellite or of the signal emitted by a deep space radio source.
For such a scenario of independent repetitions of a random experiment, the quantity that is of most interest is the maximal rate at which Alice and Bob can generate secret key bits, where rate is to be understood per execution of the random experiment generating a triple X; Y; Z].
De nition 5. The secret key rate of P XY Z for passive adversaries, denoted S(P XY Z ), is the maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on a secret key S while keeping a passive adversary's information about S arbitrarily small. More formally, it is the maximal R such that for all > 0, for all R 0 < R, and for all su ciently large n there exists a protocol with jSj = bR 0 nc that is ( ; 0)-secure against passive adversaries 5 . The secret key rate of P XY Z for active adversaries, denoted S (P XY Z ), is de ned in the same way, except that the adversary is allowed to be active, and for any given > 0, ( ; )-security is required instead of ( ; 0)-security.
The rst part of this de nition is given in 15] as a considerably strengthened de nition of that given in 14] , and the second part is new. In particular, in 14] it was only required that the rate at which Eve obtains information, I(S; C t Z n )=n be arbitrarily small for large n, and proving results for the much stronger definition involves some technical steps, including privacy ampli cation 3]. The following result was proved in 15] (and in 14] using the weaker de nition). The lower bound is not tight in general. In particular, for the binary scenario discussed in Section 4.3, if Eve's channels is less noisy than both Alice's and Bob's channel, the lower bound vanishes while the secret-key rate is actually strictly positive. 5 For the case of passive adversaries, = 0 can trivially be achieved.
We are primarily interested in investigating the relation between S(P XY Z ) and S (P XY Z ), i.e., the power of authenticated versus non-authenticated communication. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that S (P XY Z ) = 0 or S (P XY Z ) = S(P XY Z ). However, before treating the general case, we consider the case of binary symmetric random variables which is of particular interest.
The binary case
In this section we consider the natural special case where the random variables known to Alice, Bob and Eve are noisy versions of a random string (e.g. broadcast by a satellite) received over binary symmetric channels C A , C B and C E with bit error probabilities A , B and E , respectively (see Figure 1) . Without loss of generality we assume that these channels are independent because any scenario of dependent channels can be transformed 14] into an equivalent scenario of independent channels (with di erent bit error probabilities). In other words, when U denotes the random bit generated by the source (P U (0) = P U (1) = 1=2), be the bit error probabilities between corresponding bits of Alice's and Eve's and between Bob's and Eve's strings, respectively.
Assuming that Alice and Bob share no secret key initially, authentication for messages transmitted from Alice to Bob can nevertheless be achieved when Eve's channel is noisier than Alice's channel ( E > A ). This implies that BE > AB , i.e. that Alice's bits agree with Bob's bits with higher probability than Eve's bits agree with Bob's bits.
To demonstrate this fact, consider the following (very wasteful) authentication method. 6 A more e cient scheme will be considered below. In order to authenticate a single bit (k = 1) sent from Alice to Bob, Alice appends a substring of X n of length l. The two substrings of X n appended to authenticate a 0 or a 1 are disjoint. For instance, a 0 or a 1 is authenticated by appending (for some q) the string X q ; : : : ; X q+l?1 ] or X q+m ; : : : ; X q+2l?1 ], respectively, as the authenticator, and these m = 2l bits of X n are never used again for any It is easy to see that for any xed BE > AB , the probability that Eve can successfully deceive Bob is exponentially small in l.
The described scheme is quite ine cient in terms of the number of bits used from the sequence. A much better approach is described in the proof of the following theorem. Theorem 7. When BE > AB in the described binary scenario, a k-bit message sent from Alice to Bob can be authenticated by an l-bit authenticator with l = 2k using m = 4k bits of the random string X n and achieving an arbitrarily small deception probability for su ciently large k. Proof sketch. A scheme for authenticating a k-bit message sent from Alice to Bob using m bits of X n (e.g. X q ; : : : ; X q+m?1 ] for some q) can be derived as follows. Every message is authenticated by appending a particular subset of bits in X q ; : : : ; X q+m?1 ]. These subsets should be su ciently disjoint to avoid that 6 In the following we consider schemes for authenticating a k-bit message by an l-bit authenticator using m > l bits of the common sequence.
such an authenticator can be guessed by Eve from an observed one. Bob checks whether his version of the authenticator (i.e. his subset of Y q ; : : : ; Y q+m?1 ]) agrees with the received authenticator on a fraction roughly 1 ? AB of the bits, as expected when Alice sends the authenticator. Security requires that given one of these sets, it should be impossible for Eve to approximate a di erent authenticator of Alice with a bit error fraction close to AB .
When Eve has intercepted a message together with its authenticator, her best strategy for creating an authenticator for a di erent message (hoping that it will be accepted by Bob) is to copy those bits from the received authenticator that are also contained in the new authenticator and to take as guesses for the remaining bits her copies of the bits (in Z q ; : : : ; Z q+m?1 ]), introducing bit errors in those bits with probability BE . The maximal probability of successful deception is hence determined by the number d of bits that Eve must guess and the total number l of bits in the forged authenticator. By symmetry, the same technique can be used to authenticate messages sent from Bob to Alice, provided that E > B . This theorem shows that the rate at which random bits are needed for authentication is a constant factor times the bit rate at which Alice sends messages to Bob. Therefore, the secret key rate of P XY Z for active adversaries is a constant ( 1) times the secret key rate of P XY Z for passive adversaries. In the proof of the following theorem we need to show that the number of bits needed for authentication is asymptotically negligible compared to the number of bits needed for secret-key agreement (in the passive case).
Theorem 8. When both E > B and E > A in the described scenario, then S (P XY Z ) = S(P XY Z ), i.e., an active adversary is not more powerful than a passive adversary. Otherwise, if either E > B or E > A , then S (P XY Z ) = 0. Proof. The fact that S (P XY Z ) = 0 when either E < B or E < A follows from Theorem 5 because P XY Z is either X-simulatable or Y -simulatable by Eve. The fact that S (P XY Z ) = S(P XY Z ) when E > B and E > A can be proved as follows. A suboptimal protocol based on the authentication method of Theorem 7
can be used to generate a relatively small t-bit secret key K, using O(t) bits of the random string. This key can then be used, similar to a bootstrapping process, for instance based on the protocols of 10], to authenticate the messages exchanged in an optimal passive-adversary protocol P achieving S(P XY Z ). The size of K must only be logarithmic in the maximal size of a message exchanged in P 10] and linear in the number of rounds of P. No matter what amount of secret key must be generated by P, this can be achieved by using messages of size proportional to the key size in a constant number of rounds. Therefore, the ratio of size of K and the size of the generated key vanishes asymptotically. 4.4 A completeness result for the general case Let P XY Z be an arbitrary probability distribution of a random experiment that is repeated many times. In general, only lower and upper bounds on S(P XY Z ) are known and S(P XY Z ) is known exactly only for special cases. The following theorem characterizes S (P XY Z ) completely in terms of P XY Z and S(P XY Z )
and characterizes the power of active adversaries in comparison to passive ones for the described noisy-channel initialization scenario. Determining the exact power of a passive adversary remains an open problem.
Theorem 9. When P XY Z is either X-simulatable or Y -simulatable by Eve, then S (P XY Z ) = 0. Otherwise, S (P XY Z ) = S(P XY Z ).
Proof sketch. The proof of this theorem relies on the theory of typical sequences 7 and is similar to the proof of Theorem 8, which is a special case of this theorem, but the technical details are omitted from this extended abstract. In order to authenticate a k-bit message by an l = 2k-bit authenticator using m = 4k bits of X n (or of Y n when Bob is the sender), the described approach based on error correcting codes can be used to select the positions of a subsequence X i1 ; : : : ; X i l ] of X n . The receiver accepts the message if and only if the sequence of pairs (X i1 ; Y i1 ); : : : ; (X i l ; Y i l )] is -typical for the distribution P XY for some suitable small . One can prove that for every distribution P XY Z that is neither X-simulatable nor Y -simulatable by Eve, there exists a positive such that for su ciently large k Eve's cheating probability is arbitrarily small. The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 8 can be used to prove that the ratio of bits needed for authentication and of bits used for secret-key agreement vanishes asymptotically.
